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To incentivize workers and boost performance, firms often offer monetary bonuses for the 
achievement of production goals. Such bonuses appeal to two types of motivations of the 
worker. On the one hand, the existence of a goal, on its own, triggers an intrinsic 
motivation associated with the desire to not fall short of the goal. On the other hand, the 
money paid to achieve the goal constitutes an extrinsic motivation. This paper studies the 
possibility that these two effects are substitutes when workers set their own goals. We 
develop a theoretical model that predicts that if the worker is sufficiently loss averse and 
faces uncertainty about reaching a production goal, offering a monetary payment 
contingent on reaching such a goal is counterproductive. This is because under the 
presence of monetary bonuses, the loss averse worker prefers setting lower goals, which 
yield lower but more likely bonus payments. Lower goals, in turn, negatively affect 
subsequent performance. Results from a laboratory experiment corroborate this 
prediction. This paper highlights the limits of monetary bonuses as an effective incentive 
when workers are loss averse.  
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1. Introduction   
 
Offering monetary bonuses for the achievement of milestones is a widespread practice 
used by firms to incentivize workers and company executives. According to Worldatwork 
(2018), close to 98% of publicly traded American companies use at least one 
compensation scheme that includes bonuses, and 73% of these companies report that 
these bonuses are given when an individual or organizational goal is reached. The 
rationale behind including bonuses in compensation packages is that the additional 
monetary incentives created by the bonus boost performance, as long as standard 
assumptions on the worker’s preferences and cost of effort hold (Gibbons & Roberts, 
2013).  
 
There is also ample empirical evidence from psychology showing that setting a 
challenging, but attainable, goal can lead to greater effort exertion, stronger attention, and 
higher endurance in physically and cognitively demanding tasks (Heath et al.,1999; Wu 
et al., 2008). This is because the goal attains the status of a reference point, making the 
loss averse worker exert great effort to avoid experiencing the losses in utility that would 
result from falling short of the goal (Heath et al.,1999). Additionally, economists have 
shown that fully informed principals can take advantage of this feature by including 
performance goals in workers’ contracts (Corgnet et al., 2018; Corgnet et al., 2015; 
Gómez-Miñambres, 2012). If this intrinsic motivation to achieve a goal is sufficiently 
strong, monetary bonuses for goal achievement may not provide an additional incentive, 
and money spent in this manner would be wasteful expenditure for an employer. 
 
We consider an environment in which workers can set their own goals, rather than having 
them specified by an employer or another party. Allowing the worker to set own goals is 
particularly convenient when the principal knows less about workers’ potential 
performance than the worker herself, and also in settings where there is potential 
heterogeneity regarding workers’ ability in the task, but it is inappropriate or illegal for the 
employer to impose different contracts on different workers. Moreover, evidence shows 
that workers who set their own target feel they have more control over outcomes, and feel 
more involved with the firm (Groen et al., 2012).1 
 
It is not clear, however, whether the achievement of a self-chosen goal should be 
monetarily rewarded. On one hand, offering higher monetary bonuses contingent on the 
achievement of more challenging production goals can incentivize accurate goal setting, 
                                                 
1 Setting one’s own goal is also common outside the workplace. Fitness apps allow the user to set her 
own target for minutes exercised or steps walked each day. Many banks offer a calculator in which the 
account holder sets a savings goal and the amount that has to be saved each month is calculated for 
them. Apps such as Goals-on-Track and Lifetick permit the user to set their goals in a variety of areas 
and to track their progress.  
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which guarantees that workers self-select into a contract that benefits both herself and 
the principal (Laffont & Tirole, 1993; Myerson, 1981; Green & Laffont, 1977).2 On the 
other hand, if the monetary bonus does not yield enough additional benefit to the principal 
than a goal with no monetary bonus, the employer will be better off not including a 
monetary component. This is a distinct possibility in view of the literature showing that 
offering monetary incentives can be counterproductive since they can crowd-out sources 
of intrinsic motivation (Gneezy et al., 2011;  Ariely et al., 2009a; Ariely et al., 2009b, 
Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000).  
 
This paper aims to understand, using both theoretical and experimental methods, 
whether, and under which conditions, offering a monetary bonus for the achievement of 
a self-chosen goal crowds out the motivational benefits of goal setting.  To study this 
question, we develop a theoretical model and test its predictions in a laboratory 
experiment. The main result of the paper, supported both by theoretical reasoning and 
the experimental data, is the following: when workers have reference-dependent 
preferences and do not have complete information about their own ability, offering 
monetary bonuses for the achievement of self-chosen goals can yield lower performance 
compared to a situation where bonuses are not offered. This is because a worker facing 
monetary bonuses will set more conservative goals to increase her chances of obtaining 
the bonus. These lower goals are less challenging and impair performance relative to 
goals where no money is involved. Workers with greater loss-aversion, that is, who are 
more sensitive to the losses associated with not attaining the bonus, set lower goals and 
exhibit a steeper decrease in performance. In contrast, workers with standard 
preferences, that is, those who do not weight psychological losses heavily, do not exhibit 
such effects.  
 
We design a laboratory experiment to test our model’s predictions. In the experiment, 
subjects have to complete a task that requires effort and attention. To incentivize subjects, 
we use four different contracts assigned at random across subjects. The design of the 
experiment can be viewed from the perspective of a firm that is considering changes to a 
simple piece rate contract. The baseline treatment is a low-powered price rate contract, 
called LOPR. A second treatment is a high-powered piece rate contract, HIPR. 
Comparing the LOPR and HIPR conditions can indicate how much more (or less) 
performance one can get from increasing the piece rate, and whether it is worth the extra 
expenditure imposed by the higher piece rate. The third treatment, GOAL+BONUS, is a 
contract in which the low-powered piece rate is complemented with a self-chosen goal 
that yields a monetary bonus in the event that the goal is achieved. Comparing 
                                                 
2 Indeed, self-chosen goals contracts have been shown to be more cost-effective than pure piece rate 
contracts, both in the field (Groen et al., 2015; Brookins et al., 2017) and in the laboratory (Dalton et al., 
2016a). Due to its many desirable features, firms are increasingly using this practice (Groen et al., 2012, 
Bourne et all., 2013). 
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GOAL+BONUS to LOPR provides a measure of whether there is sufficient improvement 
in performance from adding a self-chosen GOAL to more than offset the bonuses that are 
paid. The final contract, GOAL, adds a self-chosen goal without any monetary bonus to 
the low piece rate. This contract represents no extra expenditure on the part of the 
employer, and has the possibility of inducing better performance at the least cost. Our 
model predicts that if individuals are sufficiently loss averse, GOAL would yield better 
performance than GOAL+BONUS. If this turns out to be the case, GOAL would dominate 
GOAL + BONUS because it would involve lower employer expenditure for higher output.    
 
Since our theoretical predictions greatly depend on the extent of individuals’ loss 
aversion, and because goal setting can also depend on subjects’ curvature of the utility 
function, we elicit subjects’ risk and loss attitudes. We implement the parameter-free 
elicitation method developed by Abdellaoui et al. (2008). This elicitation method has the 
advantage that it allows elicitation of the curvature of subjects’ utility functions, as well as 
of their degree of loss-aversion, while accounting for the possibility that subjects might 
exhibit probability weighting (Abdellaoui, 2000; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992).  
 
The experimental data confirm the main prediction of the model: subjects assigned to the 
GOAL treatment set more ambitious goals than those assigned to GOAL+BONUS and 
exhibit higher performance than subjects assigned to any of the other three contracts. 
Specifically, a non-paid goal contract leads to 11% more output, an increase in 
performance of 0.36 standard deviations, over a paid goal contract. Moreover, as 
predicted by the model, we find that performance of loss averse subjects in particular is 
greater when goals are not rewarded monetarily. In addition, we find that loss aversion is 
a relevant determinant of goal setting, while concavity of the utility function is not. Finally, 
we observe that performance under non-paid goals is 8% higher than performance under 
the piece rate contract that offers the same linear monetary incentives without goals. We 
conclude that a GOAL contract with no monetary incentives is the cheapest way to 
improve performance among the contracts we study. 
 
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it adds to the literature on 
incentives and contracting (Gibbons & Roberts, 2013; Laffont & Martimort, 2002; Laffont 
& Tirole, 1993). We show that offering monetary bonuses can be counterproductive when 
they are linked to a production goal that is set by the workers. This goes against standard 
theories of incentives and constitutes a proof of principle that in certain environments, 
offering monetary incentives could inhibit psychological motives that would otherwise 
stimulate effort.  
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Second, our paper contributes to the emerging literature on goal setting in economics 
(Wu et al., 2008; Gómez-Miñambres, 2012; Corgnet et al., 2015; Dalton et al. 2016a, 
Kaur et al. 2015, Brookins et al., 2017, Hsiaw, 2018; Koch & Nafziger, 2011, 2019). We 
propose a model of self-chosen goals in which workers have reference-dependent 
preferences with the goal as the reference point, as is common in the literature. We depart 
from the existing literature in two fundamental ways. First, we do not assume dynamic 
inconsistency as in Hsiaw (2013), Kaur et al. (2015), Hsiaw (2018) and Koch & Nafziger 
(2011; 2019). Second, we relax the assumption of certainty about reaching the goal as 
assumed by Wu et al. (2008), Corgnet et al. (2015), and Dalton et al. (2016a, 2016b). In 
a setting with certainty, the property of diminishing sensitivity is necessary to make effort 
increase with goals.3 We show that when the worker faces uncertainty about reaching a 
goal, loss aversion alone motivates higher effort. This motivational aspect of loss aversion 
was highlighted in early work by Heath et al. (1999, p. 85): “people who are below their 
goal by x units will perceive their current performance as a loss relative to their goal; thus 
they will work harder to increase their performance by a given increment than people who 
are above their goal by x units”. Thus, our model captures the idea of loss aversion as a 
motivating device.  
 
In addition, including uncertainty about reaching a self-chosen goal yields the novel and 
perhaps counterintuitive prediction that adding monetary bonuses for the achievement of 
a goal may lead to lower performance. This occurs because in our setting, the level of 
goal that is chosen determines how likely it is that the agent receives the bonus, with less 
ambitious goals more likely to be achieved. Hence, there is a trade-off based on the 
likelihood of reaching the goal, the monetary payment if reached and the psychological 
loss if not reached.  
 
This paper also contributes to the goal-setting literature as it is, to our knowledge, the first 
to quantify loss aversion and utility curvature parameters elicited in an incentive 
compatible way to study its association with goal-setting, monetary incentives, and 
individual performance. Eliciting these preference parameters allows us to empirically 
validate the mechanisms of the model.  
 
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature that examines how extrinsic incentives 
crowd-out intrinsic incentives (see Gneezy et al., 2011 and Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 
2012 for reviews and Benabou & Tirole, 2003, for a theoretical framework). In this 
literature, crowding-out effects appear when monetary incentives inhibit individuals from 
signaling to others, or even themselves, a favorable attribute such as intelligence (Ariely, 
et al., 2009b), pro-sociality (Ariely et al., 2009a; Mellstrom & Johannesson, 2016) or norm-
                                                 
3 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) refer to the property that the value function is convex over losses and 
concave over gains as diminishing sensitivity. 
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conforming behavior (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). We 
demonstrate the existence of a crowding-out effect through a completely different 
channel: intrinsic incentives that stem from individual preferences, such as loss aversion, 
can be offset by the presence of monetary incentives.  
 
Similarly, some work in behavioral and experimental economics has shown that stronger 
monetary incentives could induce lower labor supply if workers have reference-dependent 
preferences (Crawford & Meng, 2011; Farber, 2008; Fehr & Goette, 2007; Camerer et al., 
2002;). While our findings are similar, our suggested mechanism is fundamentally 
different in at least two aspects. First, in our setup, it is a self-chosen goal rather than 
expected earnings which act as the reference point. Second, we show that the crowding-
out effect goes beyond offering higher-powered monetary incentives and instead stems 
from the interaction between goal setting and loss aversion.  
 
 
2. Theoretical Framework  
 
2.1. The Model4 
 
Consider a worker who chooses to deliver a level of output 0 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 1. The worker 
experiences disutility from producing output. We assume that this disutility is captured by 
the cost function 𝑐(𝑦, 𝜃) with the following functional form: 
 




The parameter 0 < 𝜃 < 1  captures the worker’s ability on the task. The higher her ability 
is, the lower is her associated cost of producing output. We assume that this parameter 
is unknown to the worker. Instead, she knows the distribution from which is drawn.5 
Specifically, we assume that this parameter is drawn from a uniform distribution that is 
normalized to the [0,1] interval.   
Assumption 2 (Distribution of the ability parameter): 𝜃 ∼ 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓[0,1]. 
This assumption holds in a variety of settings. Examples include situations where workers 
face new tasks, or where learning about own abilities fully is not possible, either because 
                                                 
4 The proofs of all results of the model are in Appendix A.  
5 In Dalton et al. (2016a), we present a model in which the worker knows 𝜃. The predictions of that model 
differ greatly from the model presented in this paper. In Proposition 2, Dalton et al. (2016a) show that when 
the worker knows her ability, she sets a goal ensuring that she ends up in the domain of gains and increases 
performance with respect to the bonus associated with reaching her self-chosen goal.  
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it is not in the interest of the principal to give reliable feedback (Benabou & Tirole, 2003) 
or because unfavorable feedback is not assimilated by the individual in order to maintain 
a degree of confidence that is effort-enhancing (Benabou & Tirole, 2002). Furthermore, 
even if reliable feedback was provided, empirical evidence shows that individuals find it 
difficult to estimate their own skills and may fail to update their beliefs in an unbiased way 
(Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2015 and Gonzalez-Jimenez, 2019). A manifestation 
of such bias in belief updating is the existence of systematic overconfidence or 
underconfidence (Benoit et al, 2015; Grossman and Owens, 2012 and Clark & Friesen, 
2008) which reveals imperfect knowledge of own ability.  
We assume that performing the task yields pecuniary benefits to the worker, which 
translate into utility gains. The monetary incentives are determined by the contract that 
the principal offers. We begin by analyzing a case, in which the principal offers a piece-
rate contract,  𝑤(𝑦, 𝛼) = 𝑎𝑦. The contract 𝑤(𝑦, 𝛼) has the property of offering constant 




when the she decides to increase her output supply on 0 < 𝜖 < 1, irrespective of how 
much output she may have already delivered. As described in Section 4, this type of one-
dimensional piece rate contract is in effect in two of the treatments of our experiment, 
LOPR and HIPR. 
When offered this contract, the utility of the worker is: 
𝐸(𝑈(𝑦)) = ∫ 𝑎𝑦
1
0
− (1 − 𝜃)
𝑦2
2 
 𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 = 𝑎𝑦 −
𝑦2
4
.              (1) 






 , the worker’s expectation about her 
ability on the task under the assumption that 𝑓(𝜃) is a uniform distribution on [0,1]. In 
addition, an assumption made in equation (2) is that the monetary incentives enter into 
the worker’s utility linearly. This assumption captures the notion that individuals facing 
small monetary amounts do not exhibit curvature in their utility functions (see Abdellaoui, 
2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2008; Wakker & Deneffe, 1996) and the discussion in Rabin, 
2000).6  
The worker chooses an output level 𝑦𝑝 that maximizes (3), supplying a production level 




𝑦𝑝 = 0.                               (2) 
                                                 
6 Later, we will show that this assumption holds for most participants in our experiment. 
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The output level 𝑦𝑝  is the optimal production level under the piece rate. Thus, the optimal 
output level has the closed-form solution 𝑦𝑝 = 2𝑎, with the property that higher monetary 
incentives 𝑎 yield higher output.7 
We now study a case in which the worker is incentivized with a goal contract, which in 
addition to offering a piece rate 𝑎, also offers a bonus 𝐵(𝑦, 𝑔). The bonus pays a monetary 
amount in the event that the worker attains or surpasses a production goal,  𝑔, which 
belongs to the same domain as her output, so that 0 ≤ 𝑔 ≤ 1.  
Specifically, the payoff of the agent offered the goal contract is 
𝑤(𝑦, 𝐵(𝑦, 𝑔)) = 𝑎𝑦 + 𝐵(𝑦, 𝑔),       (3) 
where  
𝐵(𝑦, 𝑔) = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 < 𝑔,
𝑏𝑔 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 ≥ 𝑔,
                 (4) 
and 0 > 𝑏 > 1. Thus, the worker receives a larger bonus for achieving more ambitious 
goals, and the bonus is not awarded if the goal is not attained. This type of contract is not 
novel. According to Chung et al. (2014), it is classified as a combination of linear 
commission and a bonus with overachievement commission at quota. Similar incentive 
schemes are commonly used by firms (Kaur et al, 2015; Larkin, 2014; Oyer, 1998). 
For a given goal, ?̂?, under the incentive scheme 𝑤(𝑦, 𝐵(𝑦, ?̂?)), the worker must choose 
whether to work toward the bonus or not. She must compare her expected utility from the 
optimal level of output below the target level to that resulting from exceeding or just 
achieving the target. Denote the optimal choice of output below the goal as 𝑦 and the 
resulting expected utility level as 
 
𝐸 (𝑈 (𝑦 , ?̂?)) = 𝑎𝑦 −
 𝑦2
4
.            (5) 
 
Similarly, let the optimal output above or equal to the goal be ?̅? and the corresponding 
expected utility be 
 
𝐸(𝑈(?̅? , ?̂?)) = 𝑎?̅? + 𝑏?̂? −
?̅?2
4
 .                    (6)         
 
                                                 
7 The restriction 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤
1
2
  guarantees 0 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 1. 
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When the goal is set too high, it is optimal not to try to achieve it since its achievement 
can be prohibitively costly, i.e. 𝐸 (𝑈 (𝑦 , ?̂?)) ≥ 𝐸(𝑈(?̅? , ?̂?)). This is the case when the 






, is larger than the associated marginal benefit 
𝑎?̅? + 𝑏?̂? − 𝑎𝑦. Thus, working toward the achievement of a high goal is more likely as 𝑏 
becomes larger. Also note that when 𝐸 (𝑈 (𝑦 , ?̂?)) < 𝐸(𝑈(?̅? , ?̂?)) and  ?̅? > 𝑦𝑝 , the worker 
exerts extra effort to attain the goal beyond the amount she would have exerted if there 
were no bonus in place. Hence, with the contract 𝑤(𝑦, 𝐵(𝑦, ?̂?)), a challenging but 
attainable goal has the potential to increase output.  
Thus far, we have examined the incentives of 𝑤(𝑦, 𝐵(𝑦, 𝑔))  under exogenous goals, that 
is a goal ?̂? given by the principal or a third party. However, our interest is in goals that are 
set by the worker herself. In Proposition 1, we show that when the contract in (3) allows 
for self-chosen goals, a worker with standard preferences will set her goal exactly equal 
to her optimal level of expected output. We use the term standard preferences to describe 
an individual who derives no utility from achieving or failing to achieve the goal, other than 
from the monetary payment that it yields.  
Proposition 1:  A worker with standard preferences, who is incentivized with a self-




Under standard preferences, it is optimal to set a goal that is exactly equal to the expected 
output level. Moreover, the goal and output levels are higher, the higher the piece rate 
𝑎, and the bonus 𝑏. Note that, under standard preferences, the self-chosen goal contract 
yields higher output than the piece rate as long as 𝑏 > 0. When 𝑏 = 0, the two contracts 
have the same monetary incentives and the worker delivers the same output 𝑦∗ = 𝑦𝑝.  
Reference-dependent preferences 
Let us now suppose that the worker has reference-dependent preferences. This captures 
the notion that she does not only derive utility from the monetary incentives offered by the 
contract, but also that the presence of a goal induces a psychological (dis) utility from 
(not) achieving it. Following Wu et al. (2008) and Heath et al. (1999), we assume that the 
goal acquires the status of a reference point, dividing the output space into gains, which 
is the region of the output space where the goal is attained or exceeded, and losses, the 
region of the output space where the goal is not attained. Hence, a production goal 
induces an intrinsic, non-monetary, psychological utility that satisfies the properties of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) value function. We assume the following representation 
of this psychological utility,  
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Assumption 3 (Psychological utility) 𝑣(𝑦, 𝑔) = {
 𝜇(𝑦 − 𝑔)   𝑖𝑓 𝑦 ≥ 𝑔
−𝜇𝜆(𝑔 − 𝑦)   𝑖𝑓   𝑦 < 𝑔 
, with 𝜇 > 0 and 
𝜆 > 1. 
The parameter 𝜆 > 1  reflects the notion that the worker is loss averse, i.e. the 
psychological losses of failing short of a goal by some amount looms larger than the gains 
from surpassing the goal by the same amount. The parameter  𝜇 ≥ 0 represents the 
weight of the psychological component on the worker’s overall utility. If  𝜇 = 0,   the 
worker’s utility collapses to the case of standard preferences. Finally, note that we do not 
include diminishing sensitivity. Not including this property is consistent with our 
assumption that individuals do not exhibit curvature of the utility function and implies that 
in our setting the degree of loss aversion is the worker’s only source of risk aversion 
(Wakker, 2010). 
The expected utility of the worker with goal-dependent preferences under a set-your-own 
goal contract is 










− ∫ (𝜇𝜆(𝑔 − 𝑦))𝑓(𝜃)
𝑔
0
𝑑𝜃.                              (7)              
The first term of (7) is the expected monetary utility of producing 𝑦. The second term is 
the expected utility from producing 𝑦 above the goal. Note that this term includes both 
monetary (if 𝑏 > 0) and psychological gains. The third term is the expected psychological 
disutility from producing 𝑦 below the goal. It is informative to present (7)  after solving for 
the integrals:  
𝐸(𝑈(𝑦, 𝑔)) = 𝑎𝑦 −
𝑦2
4 
+ (1 − 𝑔)(𝑏𝑔 + 𝜇(𝑦 − 𝑔)) + 𝑔𝜇𝜆(𝑦 − 𝑔)             (8)     
From (8) we can see that the worker faces different tradeoffs when setting a goal. These 
tradeoffs change with the size of the bonus offered. Let us first assume there is no bonus, 
i.e. 𝑏 = 0. Then, for some given production level, ?̂?, the worker will want to set a goal level 
such that ?̂?  > 𝑔 holds, since such a goal guarantees utility gains stemming from 
psychological utility as depicted by the last two expressions in (8). Thus, from this 
perspective, she has reasons to set a low goal. However, setting a too low goal will not 
be optimal either. To understand why, note that by setting the lowest possible goal 𝑔 = 0, 
the last expression in (8) disappears, leading to the loss of a relevant source of utility if 𝜆 
is large and 𝑦 > 𝑔. Thus, the problem of the worker is to set a goal that guarantees 
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psychological gains and, at the same time, takes advantage of the motivational boost of 
𝜆 in the last expression. 
Now, if 𝑏 > 0, then the worker does not only want to set an achievable goal such that  𝑦 >
𝑔 holds to gain psychological utility, but she has additional reasons to set a lower goal so 
that she achieves the monetary bonus of 𝑏𝑔. Again, it is important to stress that the worker 
will not want to set the lowest goal because then she will derive lower utility.  
To solve the model, we let the worker choose output and goals simultaneously, as we did 
in the case with standard preferences. This implies that the worker is rational and 
internalizes the effect that the goal has on her expected performance and vice-versa.  




𝑦 + (1 − 𝑔)𝜇 + 𝜇𝜆𝑔 = 0,                                       (9) 
(1 − 𝑔)𝑏 − 𝑏𝑔 − (1 − 𝑔)𝜇 − 𝜇(𝑦 − 𝑔) − 𝜆𝜇(𝑔 − 𝑦) − 𝜇𝜆𝑔 = 0.                  (10) 
Which in turn yield:  





𝑏 − 𝜇 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1)𝑦
2(𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1))
,                  (12) 
 
 
where eq. (11) describes the optimal output for a given goal level and parameters 𝑎, 𝜇 
and 𝜆 while eq. (12) describes the optimal goal for a given output level and parameters 
𝑏, 𝜇 and 𝜆.The following remarks are based on equations (11) and (12) and are useful to 
understand the way that goals and output relate to each other and how they respond to 
changes in parameters of the model.  
 
Remark 1. Let 𝜇 >0. Output and goals are complementary. That is, output increases with 
higher goals, and goals increase with higher output. 
 
The complementarity between goals and output presented in Remark 1 is captured in 
various models in the goal-setting literature, for instance in Corgnet et al. (2015) or Wu et 
al. (2008). However, in these models the property of diminishing sensitivity creates the 
complementarity. Our model shows that in the absence of diminishing sensitivity, this 
positive relationship between goals and output is still present under imperfect information 
about own ability.  
 11 
 
Remark 2. Let 𝜇 > 0.The optimal output for a given goal level, 𝑦(𝑔),  increases in the 
piece rate, 𝑎 and loss aversion, 𝜆. The monetary bonus, 𝑏, does not influence 𝑦(𝑔). 
 
Remark 2 shows how parameters of the model affect output given some goal level. The 
fact that the degree of loss aversion boosts performance is typically present in models 
where goals act as a self-control device (Koch and Nafziger, 2011; 2019). In our model, 
the degree of loss aversion increases performance even when the decision maker does 
not exhibit dynamic inconsistency.  
 
Remark 3. Let 𝜇 > 0. The optimal goal for a given output level, 𝑔(𝑦), increases in the 
monetary bonus, 𝑏, and decreases in loss aversion, 𝜆,  if 𝑏 >
𝜇
(1−𝑦)
. The piece rate, 𝑎,  
does not influence 𝑔(𝑦). 
 
Remark 3 describes how the parameters of the model affect goals given an output level. 
Note that the way that loss aversion affects goals for a given output depends on the 
magnitude of 𝑏 relative to 𝜇. In the absence of monetary bonuses (i.e. 𝑏 = 0), highly loss 
averse workers will set higher goals for a given output level. However, if the monetary 
bonus is bigger than 
𝜇
(1−𝑦)
, highly loss averse workers will set lower goals.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to observe that, in this setting, a monetary bonus does not directly 
increase output (Remark 2). If there is an effect of a monetary bonus on output, it will 
come from the effect of the bonus on goals (Remark 3), and then on the subsequent effect 
of goals on output (Remark 1). 
 
 
2.2. Solution of the Model  
 
In this sub-section we express the optimal output and goal level in closed form and study 
the comparative statics at the solution with respect to the parameters we vary or measure 
in the experiment. These are the monetary bonus 𝑏 and the loss aversion parameter 𝜆. 
 
Proposition 2: A worker with the preferences given in eq. (7), with 𝜇 > 0, and who is 
incentivized with a self-chosen goals contract, chooses an output level and a goal level 
equal to:  
 
𝑦∗∗ =
2(𝜇 + 𝑎)(𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1)) + 𝜇(𝑏 − 𝜇)(𝜆 − 1)
𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) − 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2




2  + 𝜇
(𝜆 − 1)(𝛼 + 𝜇)
𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) − 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2




From Proposition 2, it is evident that when 𝜇 = 0, then  𝑦∗∗ collapses to 𝑦𝑝 (the optimal 
output under standard preferences). We now consider the influence of the exogenous 
parameters of the model on 𝑦∗∗ and 𝑔∗∗. The following corollary presents the comparative 
statics with respect to the monetary incentives of the contract.  
 
 
Corollary 1: for a worker with the preferences given in eq. (7), with 𝜇 > 0, and who is 
incentivized with a self-chosen goals contract: 
 
i) output, 𝑦∗∗, and goals, 𝑔∗∗, increase in the piece rate, 𝑎,  
ii) output, 𝑦∗∗, and goals, 𝑔∗∗, are decreasing in the level of monetary bonus, 





                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
From Remarks 2 and 3 we know that the first part of the corollary comes from a direct 
effect of 𝑎 on output, which, given the complementarity between goals and output 
(Remark 1), also raises the optimal goal in equilibrium. The positive association of piece-
rate, goals and output is empirically and theoretically documented by Corgnet et al. 
(2015), in the context of exogenous and deterministic goals.   
 
The second part of Corollary 1 states the main message of this paper: a monetary bonus 
can decrease performance. Specifically, when the worker exhibits  𝜇 >
 λ
(𝜆+1)(𝜆−1)
 , she 
sets lower goals and attains lower performance in the presence of larger bonuses. Note 
that the condition 𝜇 >
 λ
(𝜆+1)(𝜆−1)
 becomes less stringent the more loss averse the worker 
is, or, alternatively, the more weight she gives to her psychological utility.8 Hence, workers 
that give more importance to loss aversion in their utility function, either through large 
values of 𝜇 or through large values of 𝜆, are more likely to set lower goals and deliver 
lower output the greater the bonus is.  
 
Remarks 2 and 3 also indicate that the negative effect of bonuses on output emerges 
from the direct and negative effect of bonuses on goal setting, which emerges whenever 
bonuses are sufficiently large. This negative effect ultimately influences output by means 
of the complementarity between goals and output (Remark 1).  Appendix B presents a 
graphical representation of simulations of the model to illustrate the role of loss aversion 
                                                 
8 Note that the condition μ >
 λ
(λ+1)(λ−1) 




, can both be satisfied. That these two conditions hold simultaneously is less stringent 
at higher levels of loss aversion.  
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in moderating the effect of monetary bonuses on performance when the parameters of 
the model attain different values.9  
 
2.3. Comparison of the Contracts 
 
In this subsection, we compare performance when the worker faces a piece rate contract 
to performance when the worker faces a self-chosen goal contract.  Proposition 3 shows 
that the self-chosen goal contract improves performance, and that output strictly exceeds 
the goal. 
 
Proposition 3: for a worker with preferences as in eq. (7) with 𝜇 > 0, and who faces the 
same 𝑎 > 0 across contracts:  
 
i) 𝑦∗∗ > 𝑦𝑝, ∀ 𝑏 ≥ 0 
ii) 𝑦∗∗ − 𝑔∗∗ > 0 if either  𝜇 ≥ 𝑏 and  𝜇 ≤
1
2(𝜆−1)






In words, the self-chosen goal contract generates higher performance than the piece rate 
for any offered monetary bonus, 𝑏. Proposition 3 also shows that piling up, defined as the 
amount of output that exceeds the goal, is guaranteed when the weight given to 




.10  This constraint is more stringent for higher levels of loss aversion. Instead, 
when the bonus is larger than the weight given to psychological utility, piling up appears 
under less stringent conditions at higher levels of loss aversion. Namely, when the weight 





The special case in which 𝑏 = 0 is of particular interest. If 𝑏 = 0, then  𝜇 > 𝑏 holds even if 
the worker exhibits arbitrarily small 𝜇 > 0. If subjects have goal-dependent preferences, 
this particular setting captures the condition of participants who are assigned to the GOAL 
treatment described in Section 4.  
 




1 − 𝜇(𝜆 − 1)
 ,             (13) 
                                                 
9 Similarly, it can be shown that output, y∗∗, and goals, g∗∗, are decreasing in the level of loss aversion,  λ, 
when b attains a lower bound that depends on μ.  
10 Note that the condition ≤
1
2(𝜆−1)
 , and the condition guaranteeing that 𝑦∗∗ and 𝑔∗∗ are local maxima, 𝜇 <
1
(𝜆−1)
, can coexist. When 𝜇 ≤
1
2(𝜆−1)
  holds, then 𝜇 <
1
(𝜆−1)
 is satisfied making the former condition more 
stringent than the latter.  
11 Note that the condition >
1
2(𝜆−1)
 , and the condition guaranteeing that 𝑦∗∗ and 𝑔∗∗ are local maxima, 𝜇 <
1
(𝜆−1)




(𝛼 + 𝜇) −
1
2(𝜆 − 1)
1 − 𝜇(𝜆 − 1)
 .                (14) 
 
 
Corollary 2 shows that as long as 𝜇 > 0, the self-chosen goal contract yields higher 
performance than the piece rate, even when it does not offer a monetary bonus. 
 
 
Corollary 2: for a worker with preferences as in equation (7) with  𝜇 > 0, who faces the 
same 𝑎 > 0 across contracts, and  who is offered a self-chosen goal contract with 𝑏 = 0, 
then 𝑦∗∗|𝑏=0 > 𝑦𝑝. 
 
Corollary 2 demonstrates that the psychological utility from letting the worker set a goal 
is, on its own, able to motivate the worker to a greater extent than a piece rate contract 
offering the same monetary incentives.  
 
To conclude this section, we study the relationship between 𝑦∗∗|𝑏>0 and 𝑦
∗∗|𝑏=0.  
Proposition 4 states that a worker who assigns large weights to psychological utility will 
perform better under a self-chosen goal contract without bonus (the GOAL treatment in 
our experiment) than under a similar contract with a bonus (GOAL+BONUS treatment). 
 
 
Proposition 4: for a worker with preferences as in equation (7) with 𝜇 > 0, who faces the 
same 𝑎 > 0 across contracts, produces greater output when 𝑏 = 0 than when  𝑏 > 0. That 
is, 𝑦∗∗|𝑏=0 >  𝑦





Proposition 4 shows that a worker who gives sufficient weight to the psychological utility 
and/or is sufficiently loss averse, delivers higher output when the self-chosen goal 
contract is offered with 𝑏 = 0, compared to the situation in which she was offered the 
same contract, but with 𝑏 > 0. This is due to the result presented in Corollary 2: the 
negative relationship between output and bonuses, and the negative relationship 
between goals and bonuses when the worker exhibits a sufficient degree of loss aversion, 





Therefore, according to our analysis, offering a monetary bonus is only beneficial to the 
employer when the worker exhibits at most a mild degree of loss aversion. When workers 
are sufficiently loss averse, or alternatively give sufficiently large weight to the 
psychological utility, 𝜇, offering a bonus for the achievement of a self-chosen goal 
backfires. In such cases, it is better for the employer to offer a contract with 𝑏 = 0, which 






3. Hypotheses  
 
The theoretical model presented in Section 2 yields a set of hypotheses that we test in a 
laboratory experiment. First, according to Proposition 4, the introduction of monetary 
incentives in a self-chosen goal contract leads to lower goals and, consequently, lower 
output, if participants are sufficiently loss averse. Instead, Proposition 1 states that under 
standard preferences, bonuses boost output and goals. Because we expect a sizable 
fraction of participants to be loss averse, our first hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Goals and performance are greater under GOAL than under  
GOAL+BONUS. 
 
The second hypothesis concerns the interaction between the degree of loss aversion of 
individuals and the introduction of monetary bonuses. From Proposition 4 and Corollary 
1, we hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Goals and performance in the GOAL treatment exceed those in 
GOAL+BONUS by a greater difference, the more loss averse the individual is.   
 
From Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 we derive the third hypothesis, which states that a 
contract including a system of goal setting, regardless of whether it offers a bonus for the 
achievement of a self-chosen goal, outperforms a cost-equivalent piece rate contract: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Performance in GOAL and in GOAL+BONUS is greater than in LOPR. 
 
Proposition 1 shows that with no goal setting, output is increasing in the piece rate. This 
constitutes our fourth hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Performance in HIPR is greater than in LOPR.  
 
Finally, Proposition 3 predicts that under the self-chosen goal contracts, output exceeds 
the goal, i.e. there exists piling up. In the presence (absence) of bonuses, piling up is 
more (less) likely to occur when individuals are loss averse. Because, we expect a sizable 
fraction of participants to be loss averse, our last hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Performance exceeds goals in GOAL+BONUS, and this is less likely to 
happen in GOAL. 
 
 
4. Experimental Procedures 
 
4.1 General Procedures 
 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Arizona’s Economic Science 
Laboratory in May 2018. Participants were all students at the university and were 
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recruited using an electronic system. The dataset consists of 12 sessions with a total of 
161 subjects. On average, a session lasted approximately 70 minutes. Between 3 and 20 
subjects took part in each session. The currency used in the experiment was US Dollars. 
We used Otree (Chen, et al., 2016) to implement and run the experiment. Subjects earned 
on average 20.7 US Dollars. The instructions of the experiment are given in Appendix E.  
 
The experiment consisted of two parts: A and B. Upon arrival, participants were informed 
that their earnings from either Part A or Part B would be their earnings for the session, 
and that this would be decided by chance at the end of the session. Whether subjects 
faced Part A or Part B first was determined at random by the computer.  
 
4.2. Treatment Structure: Comparison of the Contracts 
 
In Part A, subjects performed a task that required their effort and attention. The task 
consisted of counting the number of zeros in a table of 100 randomly distributed zeros 
and ones. This task has been widely used by other researchers (e.g. Abeler et al., 2011, 
Gneezy et al., 2017, and Koch and Nafzinger, 2019). Subjects submitted their answers 
using the computer interface. Immediately after submission, a new table appeared on the 
computer screen and the subject was invited again to count the number of zeros in the 
new table.  
 
Subjects had six rounds of five minutes each to complete as many tables correctly as 
they could. To get acquainted with the task, subjects also had a five-minute practice round 
where it was clear that their performance did not count toward their earnings.  After each 
round ended, subjects were given feedback about the number of tables they solved 
correctly, their earnings for that round. If applicable, they were reminded of their goal for 
that round and were told whether that goal was achieved. Thus, aside from the practice 
round, subjects had 30 minutes to work on the task and where given small intervals in-
between whereby they could assess their past performance. Since the time between goal 
setting and performance was almost immediate, we rule out by design any self-control 
problems, which have shown to affect goal-setting behavior. 
  
There were four treatments, LOPR, HIPR, GOAL, and GOAL+BONUS. The treatments 
differed only with respect to the incentives offered to subjects. Each participant was 
randomly assigned to one of the four treatments. We ensured randomization in our design 
by having subjects in any experimental session face the same chance of being assigned 
to any of the treatments. The incentives in effect in each treatment were the following. 
 
- LOPR: Subjects were paid 0.20 dollars for each correctly solved table.  
- HIPR: Subjects were paid 0.50 dollars for each correctly solved table.  
- GOAL: Subjects were paid 0.20 dollars for each correctly solved table and were asked 
at the beginning of each round to set a personal goal regarding the number of tables that 
they aimed to solve in that round.  
- GOAL+BONUS: Identical to the GOAL treatment, with the exception that subjects were 
offered a monetary bonus for reaching their goals. The bonus in dollars was equivalent 
to the goal set by the subject multiplied by a factor of 0.20.  
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LOPR can be viewed as a baseline condition to which different features that may improve 
performance are added. HIPR includes an increase in the piece rate, while GOAL adds 
a goal set by the worker. GOAL+BONUS adds the goal, as well as a monetary payment 
for reaching it, which is larger the more ambitious the goal. 
 
4.3 Elicitation of Risk Attitudes 
 
In Part B of the experiment, the task was to choose between two binary lotteries in multiple 
trials. This part of the experiment was designed to elicit subjects’ loss aversion and utility 
curvature. The lotteries yielded either only gains, or were mixed in the sense that either 
gains or losses were possible. We used the Abdellaoui et al. (2008) method, which has 
the advantage of eliciting risk and loss attitudes without making any assumptions about 
the way in which subjects evaluate outcomes or probabilities.  
Our implementation of Abdellaoui et al.’s (2008) method consisted of 10 decision sets. 
Each decision set was designed to elicit indifference between two initial lotteries through 
bisection. The algorithm was programmed so that the subject’s choice between two initial 
lotteries determines the next choice problem that the subject faces. Specifically, in the 
next choice trial either the lottery chosen in the preceding trial was replaced by a less 
attractive alternative, or the one not chosen was replaced by a more attractive alternative, 
while the other choice remained the same. The subject was again invited to choose 
between the two available options. This process was repeated four times.  
Decision sets 1 to 5 elicited subjects’ utility curvature. In each decision set, the algorithm 
elicited the certainty equivalent 𝑥𝑗 of a lottery of the form  𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑗 = (𝐻𝑗 , 0.5; 𝐿𝑗 , 0.5)  with 
𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,5, 𝐻𝑗 ≥ 0, and 𝐿𝑗 ≥ 0. We chose the values of 𝐻𝑗 and 𝐿𝑗  so that the outcomes 
of the lottery were close to the payoffs that we expected in Part A of the experiment. This 
allowed us to correlate the elicited risk preferences at comparable financial stakes with 
their behavior in the real-effort task. The values of 𝐻𝑗 and 𝐿𝑗  used in each decision set 
are given in Table 1. 
      Table 1:  High and Low Values Used in Lotteries to Measure Utility Curvature 
Lottery 𝑗 = 1 𝑗 = 2 𝑗 = 3 𝑗 = 4 𝑗 = 5 
𝐻𝑗 4 8 12 20 20 
𝐿𝑗 0 0 0 0 12 
Panel A of Table 2 below details an example of the bisection algorithm used to find 𝑥1, the 
certainty equivalent of 𝐿1. Note that initially, option 𝑅 is a degenerate lottery that pays the 
expected value of option L, which, in turn, is equal to  𝐿1. The example shows that after 
having made a first choice, the subject faces a new problem whereby R, the option that 
was chosen before, becomes less attractive. In the remaining repetitions, the individual’s 
preferred option is L, even though lottery R becomes more attractive. The certainty 
equivalent was determined finally as 𝑥2 =1.625, the midpoint between 1.75 and 1.5.  
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Decision sets 6 to 10 elicited subjects’ loss aversion. The program was designed to find 
the outcome 𝑧𝑗 < 0  that made an individual indifferent between a sure outcome of zero 
and a mixed lottery of the form (𝑘𝑗 , 0.5; 𝑧𝑗 , 0.5), with 𝑘𝑗 > 0 for 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,5. A loss averse 
subject would require low values of 𝑧𝑗  to be indifferent, whereas a gain-seeking subject 
would require large values of 𝑧𝑗 to be indifferent. The starting values of the program were 
set at the certainty equivalent of a decision set 𝑗, i.e. 𝑘𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖, and its mirror image, that is  
𝑧𝑗 = −𝑥𝑗  . Panel B of Table 2 presents an example of the bisection algorithm used to find 
these negative outcomes. Note that in this example the certainty equivalent elicited in 
Panel A, 𝑥1 =1.625, is used as an outcome of the mixed lottery. Also, note that the mirror 
image of , 𝑥1, e.g.-1.625, is used initially as the other outcome of the mixed lottery. The 
elicited value in this example, 𝑧1 =-1.40, was the value that made the subject indifferent 
between the lottery (1.625𝑗 , 0.5; −1.40, 0.5) and zero.  
Table 2. Example of the elicitation procedure for certainty equivalents 
 Panel A Panel B 
Repetition Lottery L Lottery R Choice Lottery L Lottery R Choice 
Initial 
lottery 
(4,0.5;0,0.5) 2 R (1.62,0.5; 
-1.62,0.5) 
0 R 
1 (4,0.5;0,0.5) 1 L (1.62,0.5; 
-0.81,0.5) 
0 L 
2 (4,0.5;0,0.5) 1.5 L (1.62,0.5; 
-1.20,0.5) 
0 L 





 𝒙𝟏 =1.625  𝒛𝟏 =-1.40   
 
This table presents an example of Abdellaoui et al.’s (2008) algorithm used to find certainty equivalents {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5} 
and the sequence of negative numbers {𝑧1𝑧2, 𝑧3, 𝑧4, 𝑧5}.The left panel presents how 𝑥2 is elicited with the algorithm. The 
right panel shows how  𝑧2 could be elicited.  
 
Once subjects finished both parts, they were reminded about their performance in each 
round of the real-effort task, as well as whether they achieved their goal in that round, if 
any. Also, subjects were informed about the lottery that was chosen for potential 
compensation for Part B and its realization. They were also informed about which part of 
the experiment (Part A or B) was chosen to become their final earnings. Finally, 
participants completed a questionnaire about their general willingness to take risks, as 
well as specific risks (health, job, and driving related). These questions were taken from 
Dohmen et al. (2011). The questionnaire also included a measure of self-efficacy. The 






5.1 Goal Setting 
 
Our first hypothesis stated that goals would be higher in GOAL than in GOAL+BONUS.  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics regarding the goals set by subjects throughout 
the experiment, by treatment. Figure 1a presents the distribution of goals in these two 
treatments.  
 
We find indeed that subjects assigned to GOAL set significantly higher goals than 
subjects assigned to GOAL+BONUS (t(53.069)= 2.61297, p=0.005).12 Participants 
assigned to GOAL set an average goal of 48.82 tables, while those in the GOAL+BONUS 
treatment averaged 37.48 tables. This represents a difference of 30.2%, or 0.57 standard 
deviations, between the two treatments. This result supports the first part of Hypothesis 
1: Goals are higher under GOAL than under the GOAL+BONUS. 
 
Table 3. Goals by Treatment 
 
Treatment   N
         
Mean Median S.D. 25th  




GOAL +BONUS    39 37.487        38 10.308                29 43 64 20 
GOAL 41 48.829 45 25.706 34 54 180 18 









In Appendix D, we show that the difference between the treatments becomes greater over 
the rounds, indicating that not only do subjects adjust their goals after being provided with 
                                                 
12 A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test yields the same conclusion (U=2.842, p=0.004).  
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feedback, but also that this adjustment induces a larger difference in goal setting between 
the treatments.  
 
We regress the goal level set by individuals on assignment to the treatments, while 
controlling for loss aversion for some specifications.  We use Poisson count regressions 
to account for the count nature of the goals data. The estimates confirm Hypothesis 1: 
subjects set higher average goals when goals are not monetarily rewarded with a bonus. 
Table 4 (col. 2 and 3) also shows that loss averse individuals set on average higher goals, 
another pattern predicted by our model.  
 
 
Table 4. Goals as Function of Treatment and Preference Parameters 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Goal Level 
(all 
participants) 






GOAL 0.264*** 0.262*** 0.378*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) 
Loss Averse  0.133*** 0.241*** 
  (0.038) (0.054) 
Constant 3.624*** 3.530*** 3.426*** 
 (0.026) (0.038) (0.053) 
Log-Likelihood -475.870 -469.699 -280.819 
N 80 80 44 
 
Note: This table presents the estimates of Poisson regressions of the statistical model Goal Level =  β0 + β1GOAL +
Γ′Controls + ℇi with ℇi~Poisson (ω).  “Goal Level” equals the sum of a subject’s goals in the real-effort task. Subjects 
were randomly assigned either to the “GOAL” or the “GOAL+BONUS” treatment. The latter is the benchmark condition 
of the regression. ``Loss Averse’’ is a dummy variable that captures whether a subject is loss averse or not. A subject 
is classified as loss averse when at least four variables 𝜆𝑗 , where  𝜆𝑗 ≡ 𝑥𝑗/𝑧𝑗, are larger than one.  Model (3) presents 
estimates of a regression including only subjects classified as having linear utility. Standard errors presented in 
parenthesis.  * indicates a p-value <0.1, ** indicates a p-value <0.05, ***indicates a p-value <0.01. 
 
 
5.2 Performance  
 
Hypothesis 1 also asserts that performance in the GOAL treatment would be higher than 
in GOAL+BONUS. Also, Hypothesis 3 states that GOAL and GOAL+BONUS leads to 
higher performance than LOPR, and Hypothesis 4 proposes that performance would be 
higher in HIPR than in LOPR. In this subsection, we examine how performance compares 
across treatments. Recall that we define performance in the experiment as the total 
number of tables an individual solves correctly.  
 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics of performance by treatment. Figure 1b also 
shows the distribution of performance in GOAL and GOAL+BONUS. We find that paying 
a monetary bonus for achieving a goal does indeed backfire. Subjects assigned to GOAL 
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solve a higher average number of tables, on average 47.58 tables, than subjects assigned 
to GOAL+BONUS, who solve 42.897 tables on average (t(77.88)= 1.485, p=0.07).13 The 
size of this effect is 11.1%, or 0.36 standard deviations.14 According to our model, this 
implies that most of our subjects are loss averse. We consider, in Section 6, whether this 
is the case, using the data from our independent measure of loss aversion.  
 
Table 5. Performance by treatment 
 
Treatment   N
         
Mean Median S.D. 25th       75th Max Min Mean 
Cost 
GOAL +BONUS    39 42.897   43 13.480          34 48 80 17 9.74 
GOAL 41 47.585   47 14.747          39 56 86 17 9.517 
HIPR 41 42.073 43 15.408          31 48.5          72 5 21.036 
LOPR 39 42.179 41 15.022          27 55 72 16 8.436 









In addition, we observe that subjects assigned to GOAL display higher average 
performance than those assigned to either of the piece rate treatments, LOPR (t(75.99)= 
1.520, p= 0.066) or HIPR (t(73.69)= 1.805, p=0.037).15 The effect size of the mean 
differences between the treatments is 0.401 standard deviations and 0.406 standard 
deviations, respectively. The fact that output is higher under GOAL than under HIPR 
shows that an employer setting up a GOAL contract rather than a higher piece rate can 
                                                 
13 A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test generates the same conclusion (U= 1.584, p=0.056). 
14 The power of this test is 0.671. The design of the experiment aimed at a power of 0.8 with an effect 
size of 0.5 standard deviations. However, the sizeable variation in performance on the task, evident in 
larger-than anticipated standard deviations of performance, led to lower power.  
15  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests of these differences yield U= 1.494 (p=0.074) and U= 1.512 (p=0.065), 
respectively.  
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extract higher output from workers at lower cost. Overall, these results partially support 
Hypothesis 3. 
 
However, Hypothesis 3 is not fully supported in our data. We do not find significant 
differences in average performance between GOAL+BONUS and LOPR (t(72.24)= -
0.0477, p= 0.962), GOAL+BONUS and HIPR (t(73.668)= -0.316, p= 0.752) or LOPR and 
HIPR (t(73.668)= -0.316, p= 0.752).16 Raising the piece rate or adding a set-your-own-
goal contract with a bonus did not improve performance over LOPR. These findings are 
similar to those in Fehr & Goette (2007). 
 
We also perform Poisson count regressions of individual performance on treatment 
dummies and relevant controls. Table 6 presents the regression estimates, which confirm 
the aforementioned findings. Specifically, the coefficient associated with GOAL is 
significant at the 5% level for all specifications: subjects in GOAL exhibit higher average 
performance than subjects in GOAL+BONUS. Similarly, the coefficient of GOAL is 
significantly larger than the coefficient associated with LOPR (𝜒2 = 13.28, p= 0.001) and 
also larger than that for HIPR (𝜒2 = 16.79, p= 0.001).17  
 
Table 6.   Performance as Function of Treatment and Preference Parameters 
   






(linear utility only) 
GOAL 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.176*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.045) 
HIPR -0.019 -0.034 0.098** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) 
LOPR -0.017 -0.020 -0.134*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.048) 
Loss Averse  0.135*** 0.169*** 
  (0.028) (0.038) 
Constant 3.759*** 3.664*** 3.585*** 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.043) 
Log-Likelihood -846.727 -834.826 -442.010 
N 160 160 91 
 
Note: This table presents the estimates of Poisson regressions of the statistical model Performancei =  β0 + β1GOAL +
β2HIPR + β3LOPR + β4Loss Averse + ℇi with ℇi~Poisson (ω).  “Performance” measures the total number of tables a 
subject solves correctly over the six rounds of the real-effort task.  Subjects were assigned either to the GOAL, HIPR, 
LOPR, or GOAL+BONUS treatment. The GOAL+BONUS treatment is the benchmark category of the regression. ̀ `Loss 
Averse’’ is a dummy variable that indicates whether a subject is loss averse or not. A subject is classified as loss averse 
when at least four of her variables 𝜆𝑗 , where  𝜆𝑗 ≡ 𝑥𝑗/𝑧𝑗, are greater than one. Model (3) presents estimates of a 
regression including only those subjects classified as having linear utility.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. * indicates 
a p-value <0.1, ** indicates a p-value <0.05, ***indicates a p-value <0.01 
                                                 
16 These conclusions are also confirmed by Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. The U-statistics of these 
comparisons and their respective p-values are U= 0.110 (p= 0.912), U= 0.048 (p= 0.961), and U= 0.034 
(p= 0.973), respectively.   
17 We use the estimates of column (2) in Table 6 for statistical inference.  
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Additionally, the coefficients for the LOPR and HIPR treatments are not significant for the 
specification in columns (1) and (2), corroborating the findings of the pairwise tests that 
performance in LOPR, HIPR and GOAL+BONUS are statistically indistinguishable (𝜒2 = 
0.16, p= 0.6887).18  
 
However, when the regression is performed including only subjects with linear utility, 
significant differences among the treatments emerge.19 Column (3) of Table 6 shows that 
subjects with linear utility assigned to GOAL+BONUS exhibit higher average performance 
than those in LOPR. This suggests that a system of goal setting with monetary bonus is 
more effective than increasing the piece rate. Thus, when all assumptions of the model 
hold, including the requirement that workers are risk neutral for monetary payments, there 
is support for Hypothesis 3.20 As in the analyses reported previously, these estimates 
show that subjects assigned to GOAL exhibit higher average performance than those 
assigned to any other treatment.   
 
 
Table 7. Difference between Performance and Goals by Round  
 
 Round 
 1        
Round 
2      
Round 
3        
Round 
4     
Round 




GOAL+BONUS        
Mean    0.410 0.948                 1 0.641 1.282 1.128 0.901 
Median 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 
S.D. 2.435 1.848 1.933 2.590 1.972 2.154 1.141 
GOAL        
Mean -1.463 -1.073 0.073 0.317 0.512 0.536 -0.207 
Median 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.166 
S.D. 5.532 4.880 4.797 4.687 4.675 4.135 4.123 
 
 
Furthermore, Hypothesis 5 predicts pilling-up in GOAL+BONUS, as well as to a lesser 
extent in GOAL. Table 7 shows that for subjects in GOAL, the average piling up is 
negative in the first round and becomes not significantly different from zero in subsequent 
                                                 
18 These results and those presented in Subsection 5.1 are robust to adding an ability variable in the 
regression, measured by the number of correct tables that subjects completed in the 5-minute practice 
round. 
19  Details of these classifications are given in Section 6 and Appendix C. To classify subjects according 
to their curvature we constructed variables ∆𝑖𝑗≡ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝐸𝑉𝑗, where 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is the certainty equivalent of subject 𝑖 
for lottery 𝑗, 𝐸𝑉𝑗  stands for the expected value of the lottery, and 𝑗 = {1, … ,5} is an indicator of the used 
lottery. A subject was classified as having a linear utility function when for at least four ∆𝑖𝑗s the null 
hypothesis that they are equal to zero was not rejected.  
20 The estimates presented in column (3) of Table 6 confirm that there is no empirical evidence in our 
data to support the notion that higher-powered piece rates yield higher output, even if only individuals 
who have linear utility are considered. This corroborates the results of the pairwise tests and the 
regression estimates using the full sample.   
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rounds. This finding implies that subjects in the treatment in which goals are not 
incentivized on average meet their self-chosen goal. In contrast, for subjects in 
GOAL+BONUS, piling up is positive after round 1. The average piling up level over is 
significantly positive for subjects in GOAL+BONUS (t(38)= 4.934, p<0.001) and not 
different from zero for participants in GOAL (t(40)=-0.322,p=0.749) When comparing 
piling up between these treatments, we find a significant difference (t(78)=-1.62, p= 
0.054). These findings support Hypothesis 5. 
 
 
6. Risk Attitudes and their Relationship to Crowding out 
 
The aim of this section is to describe the attitudes of participants toward risk and losses, 
and to test Hypothesis 2, which proposes that the crowding-out effect of the monetary 
bonus is more pronounced for more loss averse participants.  
 
6.1. Risk Attitudes 
 
To measure subjects’ attitudes towards risky monetary payments, we use data from part 
B of the experiment, where we elicit the certainty equivalents of five lotteries that offer 
positive payments,  {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5}, and the sequence of negative outcomes, 
{𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3, 𝑧4, 𝑧5}, each of them making subjects indifferent between receiving zero and a 
mixed lottery (𝑥𝑗 , 0.5; 𝑧𝑗 , 0.5) for any 𝑗 = {1,2,3,4,5}. We classify participants according to 
the curvature of their utility function, e.g. concave, convex or linear, as well as according 
to their sensitivity toward losses.  
 
We find that the majority of subjects in our sample have linear utility functions in the 
domain of gains. Specifically, 91 subjects are classified as having a linear utility function 
(proportion test against 0.5, p=0.048), while 65 have a concave utility function, and only 
five have a convex utility function. Details of this classification are included in Appendix 
C. When a power utility function is assumed, 𝑥𝑠𝑗 = 𝐸𝑉𝑠𝑗
𝜃 where 𝐸𝑉 is the expected value 
of lottery 𝑗 and 𝑠 indicates the individual, we find the pooled estimate across participants 
to be 𝜃 = 0.95, reflecting that the majority of individuals in the sample have linear utility 
and that those classified as having a concave utility typically have only modest concavity. 
In Appendix C, we show that similar conclusions are reached when other families of utility 
functions are assumed. These results confirm that our assumption that subjects have 
linear utility functions is reasonable.  
 
In addition, we find that most subjects are loss averse. Specifically, 134 subjects are 
classified as loss averse and only 27 are gain-seeking (more sensitive to gains than 
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losses of the same magnitude). Appendix C presents further details of this classification. 
Importantly, participants are balanced across treatments with respect to both the mean 
level of loss aversion and the proportion of loss averse participants.21  
 
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics of the loss aversion coefficients, 𝜆𝑗, obtained by 
computing 𝜆𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗  /𝑧𝑗, for 𝑗 = 1, … ,5. Following Abdellaoui et al. (2008), we compute one 
loss aversion coefficient for each mixed lottery that we implement. We find that, on 
average, subjects exhibit loss aversion for every mixed lottery. The null hypothesis that 
the loss aversion coefficient is equal to one is rejected for each lottery. Moreover, we 
cannot reject the null that the five loss aversion coefficients are equal to each other 
(F(4,805)=0.26, sphericity-corrected p-value=0.613), corroborating the notion that sign-
dependence, rather than the magnitude of the loss, determines loss aversion.  
 
 
Table 8. Loss Aversion Estimations 
 
 𝝀𝟏 𝝀𝟐 𝝀𝟑 𝝀𝟒 𝝀𝟓 𝝀𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 
Mean 3.459 3.676 3.712 3.548 3.945 3.668 
Median 1.777 1.777 1.777 1.777 2.285 2.136 
S.D. 4.798 4.716 4.699 4.166 4.566 3.752 
25th perc. 0.516 1.066 1.066 1.230 1.066 1.208 
75th perc, 3.2 3.2                   3.2 5.333 5.333 4.48 
 
 
Aggregating the coefficients across lotteries and individuals, subjects exhibit an average 
loss aversion coefficient of 3.7 and a median coefficient of 2.13. This implies that, for our 
subjects, losses loomed on average 3.7 times larger than equally-sized gains. Previous 
studies that used the same definition of loss aversion found a median loss aversion 
parameter of similar magnitude. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) median 
estimate was 2.25, Abdellaoui et al. (2007) reported a median estimate of 2.54,  
Abdellaoui et al. (2016) observed a median estimate of 1.88, and Abdellaoui et al. (2008), 
using the same method to elicit loss aversion, obtained a median loss aversion parameter 
equal to 2.61. As in our study, Abdellaoui et al. (2008) found considerable heterogeneity, 
                                                 
21 The proportion of loss averse subjects is 0.717 in LOPR, 0.6923 in GOAL, 0.6923 in GOAL+BONUS and 
0.804 in HIPR. We use a two-sample test of proportions and find that these proportions are not significantly 
different from each other (LOPR vs. GOAL (p=0.786), HIPR vs. GOAL (p= 0.230), GOAL+BONUS vs. 
GOAL (p= 0.985)). Mean loss aversion is on average 3.44 for GOAL, 3.94 for GOAL+BONUS, 3.55 for 
HIPR and 3.75 for LOPR. The distribution of loss aversion is not significantly different between pairs of 
treatments, according to t-tests (LOPR vs. GOAL (p= 0.7046), HIPR vs. GOAL (p= 0.889), GOAL+BONUS 
vs. GOAL (p= 0.564)). 
 
 26 
reflected in the size of the interquartile range (the difference between the 25th and 75th 
percentile).   
 
6.2. Interaction of Loss Aversion with the Bonus Treatment 
 
Next, we examine the role of loss aversion in explaining the treatment effects. We first 
evaluate the strength of the treatment effects among loss averse subjects. According to 
Hypothesis 1, sufficiently loss averse subjects would set higher goals and exhibit higher 
performance when assigned to GOAL than to GOAL+BONUS.  Moreover, according to 
Hypothesis 2, more loss averse subjects would exhibit a larger positive difference in both 
goals and performance between GOAL than to GOAL+BONUS. 
 
To perform a conclusive test of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we extend the OLS regression 
specifications presented in Tables 4 and 6 by adding an interaction dummy for whether a 
subject is both loss averse and is assigned the GOAL treatment. In this manner, we 
evaluate whether relatively loss averse subjects display greater positive differences in 
performance and the goals they set when assigned to GOAL rather than to 
GOAL+BONUS. 
 
Table 9 presents results of these regressions.  Columns (1) and (3) show that the 
estimates of “GOAL”, as well as those of the interaction between ``Loss averse’’ and 
``GOAL’’, are positive and significant. Hypothesis 1 is supported by the estimates on the 
interaction term: Loss averse subjects assigned to GOAL exhibit higher performance and 
set higher goals compared to those assigned to GOAL+BONUS, and the treatment 
difference is larger than for individuals in GOAL who are not loss averse ((𝜒2(1) =7.76, 
p=0.005) and (𝜒2(1) =15.37, p<0.001), respectively). 
 
To distinguish participants with a high degree of loss aversion from those who are only 
mildly loss averse, we use a median split. That is, we classify subjects as having a high 
degree of loss aversion if their average loss aversion coefficient is above the median (of 
2.136). Subjects with an average loss aversion coefficient below the median but higher 
than 1 are classified as mildly loss averse. We use the same count regression 
specifications as in Tables 4 and 6 but we replace ``Loss Averse’’ with dummies for “High 
Loss Averse” and “Mild Loss Averse”. Also, we interact the dummy variables for the 







Table 9. Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects by Participant Loss Aversion Level  
 










GOAL 0.093* 0.136** 0.148** 0.159* 
 (0.056) (0.064) (0.067) (0.083) 
GOAL*Loss Averse 0.236***  0.351***  
 (0.043)  (0.054)  
GOAL*High Loss Averse  0.188***  0.327*** 
  (0.054)  (0.076) 
GOAL* Mild Loss Averse  0.136**  0.151** 
  (0.063)  (0.060) 
Loss Averse 0.131***  0.045  
 (0.033)  (0.057)  
High Loss Averse  0.144***  0.074 
  (0.043)  (0.079) 
Mild Loss Averse  0.051  -0.015 
  (0.045)  (0.078) 
HIPR -0.034 -0.013   
 (0.034) (0.034)   
LOPR -0.020 -0.014   
 (0.035) (0.035)   
Constant 3.666*** 3.663*** 3.593*** 3.602*** 
 (0.034) (0.043) (0.048) (0.067) 




N 160 160 80 80 
 
Note: This table presents the estimates of the Poisson regression of the specification Performancei =  β0 + β1GOAL ∗
Loss Averse + β2GOAL + β3LOPR + β4LOPR + β5Loss Averse + ℇi with ℇi~Poisson (ω) as well as the Poisson regression 
of the specification Goal leveli =  β0 + β1GOAL ∗ Loss Averse + β2GOAL + β3LOPR + β4LOPR + β5Loss Averse + 𝐼 with 
ℇi~Poisson (ω) . “Performance” is the total number of correctly solved tables by a subject over all rounds and “Goal 
level” is the sum of the goals set by the subject over all rounds.  Subjects were assigned either to the GOAL, HIPR, 
LOPR, or the GOAL+BONUS treatment. GOAL+BONUS is the benchmark category for the regression. ``Loss Averse’’ 
is a dummy variable that captures whether a subject is loss averse or not. A subject is loss averse when at least four 
of her variables 𝜆𝑗 , where  𝜆𝑗 ≡ 𝑥𝑗/𝑧𝑗, are greater than one, ``Mild Loss averse’ equals 1 if a subject is loss averse and 
her average 𝜆 is lower than the median subject in the sample, and equals 0 otherwise. ``High Loss averse’ equals 1 if 
a subject is loss averse and her average 𝜆 is lower than the median participant in the sample and 0 otherwise. See 
Appendix C for a detailed explanation of these measurements. Standard errors are in parenthesis. * indicates a p-value 
<0.1, ** indicates a p-value <0.05, ***indicates a p-value <0.01. 
 
The estimates in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 9 show that subjects with a high degree of 
loss aversion set relatively higher goals when assigned to GOAL than to GOAL+BONUS 
(𝜒2(1) = 22.30, p= 0.001). As with goals, there is a difference in performance between 
the two treatments for subjects with high degrees of loss aversion (𝜒2(1) = 4.89, p= 
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0.027), with those in GOAL exhibiting better performance. Mildly loss averse subjects also 
exhibit a treatment difference, but the coefficient is smaller and less significant. Thus, the 
superior performance and higher goals under GOAL compared to GOAL+BONUS are 
primarily driven by highly loss averse individuals. 
 
Moreover, Table D.2 in Appendix D corroborates the pattern that subjects with both a 
linear utility for money and a high degree of loss aversion exhibit a stronger treatment 
effect. Overall, these findings are all supportive of Hypothesis 2. Additionally, in Table D.3 
of Appendix D, we present evidence suggesting that there is no interaction between 
exhibiting a concave utility function for money and the presence of monetary bonuses in 
explaining goal levels. Thus, if concave utility functions have an effect in performance, 




This paper shows that offering monetary bonuses for the achievement of self-chosen 
goals can significantly reduce performance.  If a worker exhibits loss aversion and does 
not have perfect knowledge about her own ability, setting an ambitious goal can boost 
performance since she would exert high effort to avoid the psychological losses from 
falling short of her goal. The introduction of monetary bonuses for meeting a self-chosen 
goal crowds out this motivational effect, since the worker will prefer setting lower goals to 
increase the likelihood that the monetary bonus is achieved. This behavior is detrimental 
to performance since lower goals correlate with lower effort. Thus, a goal contract with no 
monetary payment can lead to better performance than one where achieving the goal 
comes with a monetary bonus. The results of the experiment demonstrate that this 
theoretical possibility can be observed in a real, incentivized task that requires cognitive 
effort.   
 
The theoretical framework allows us to pin down the conditions guaranteeing these 
results. The presence of loss aversion determines whether introducing bonuses is 
detrimental to performance. The experiment corroborates the theoretical proposition that 
loss averse individuals set lower goals and perform particularly worse when their self-
chosen goal carries monetary consequences. Moreover, the theory also predicts that 
more loss averse individuals exhibit this crowding out effect more strongly. Indeed, in our 
sample, participants who exhibit a greater degree of loss aversion display a larger 
difference in performance between the GOAL and GOAL+BONUS treatments.  
 
Insofar as our empirical findings generalize to less controlled non-laboratory 
environments, this paper suggests that including monetary bonuses in a worker’s 
compensation scheme does not necessarily guarantee better worker performance. 
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Similarly, increasing the piece rate may also not improve performance. A scheme in which 
individuals set their own goals, when achieving the goal carries no monetary bonus, is 
the most effective incentive scheme that we have studied. From an employer’ s point of 
view, given that there is already a piece rate in place, a GOAL scheme dominates all 
others in that it extracts the highest output with no increase in unit wage costs. It is 
plausible that these results hold for a broad class of environments, though obviously 
further research would be required in order to make stronger claims about the generality 
of our results. 
 
This paper opens promising avenues for future research. First, although laboratory 
experiments ensure internal validity, it would be interesting to replicate our experiment in 
a more natural environment with different pools of subjects. Second, future research could 
study the emergence and size of the crowding out effect under more general conditions. 
This may require giving-up on closed-form theoretical solutions and require the use of 
other methods to derive predictions. Finally, we restricted our study to the optimal choice 
of goals and output when monetary incentives are kept constant. It would be relevant to 
examine the optimal choice of monetary incentives (i.e. magnitude of the piece rate and 
eventual combination with bonus) in light of the crowding out effect that we have 
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PROOF: We first show that at an optimum, it must be the case that 𝑦∗ = 𝑔∗. Second, we 





. First, when 𝑦 ≠ 𝑔 either 𝑦 or 𝑔 is not optimal. Consider 




. By reducing her goal and setting 𝑦𝑙 = 𝑔 




. Now consider a 









. Therefore,  𝑦 must be set to be equal to 𝑔.  
 
The second step is to derive the optimal goal. By the first step of the proof, we know that 
the agent will always work exactly as much as needed to receive the bonus. Her expected 
utility is then  





𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 + ∫ 𝑏𝑦
1
𝑦
𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃                (𝐴. 1) 
 
=  𝐸(𝑈(𝑦, 𝑔)) = 𝑎𝑦 −
𝑦2
4
+ 𝑏𝑦(1 − 𝑦)                                 (𝐴. 2) 
 
 
To derive the optimal goal, we consider the first order condition for the maximization of 
earnings with respect to output, 
 
𝑎 + 𝑏 −
𝑦∗
2
− 2𝑏𝑦∗ = 0.                 (𝐴. 3) 
 




















 , which is non-negative as long as 0 ≤ a ≤
1
2
, the piece rate interval that guarantees 




PROOF: The expected utility of the worker facing the self-chosen goals contract is given 
by eq. (8). The optimal output and effort are given by the first order conditions depicted 
by eq. (9) and eq. (10) respectively.  
 
We first show that the solution to the system of equations is a local maximum. To that 











= −2(𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1)). The cross derivative between goals and output is 
𝜕2𝐸(𝑈(𝑦,𝑔))
𝜕𝑦 𝜕𝑔






 𝜇(𝜆 − 1)
 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) −2(𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1))
)          (𝐴. 4) 
 
 The determinant of 𝐷 is  |𝐷| = 𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1)  −  𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2.  Therefore, a sufficient 
condition for |𝐷| > 0  is 𝜇 <
1
(𝜆−1)
, and the necessary condition for this system to yield a 
global maximum is 𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) >  𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2 > 0.  
 
We are now in a position to solve the system of equations. Substituting eq. (10) into eq. 
(9) yields 
𝑦∗∗ =
2(𝜇 + 𝑎)(𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1)) + 𝜇(𝑏 − 𝜇)(𝜆 − 1)
𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) − 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2
         (𝐴. 5) 
 




2  + 𝜇
(𝜆 − 1)(𝛼 + 𝜇)
𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) − 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2
.         (𝐴. 6) 
 




















2(𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1))
𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) − 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2
,                  (𝐴. 7) 
 







𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) − 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2
.                (𝐴. 8) 
 
Note that (A.7) ad (A.8) are always positive since 𝜆 > 1 and  𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) > 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2.  
The latter is the necessary condition guaranteeing that 𝑦∗∗ and 𝑔∗∗ are local maxima, as 
shown in Proposition 2.  
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< 0 and 
𝜕𝑔∗∗
𝜕𝑏
< 0 conditional on 𝜇 and 𝜆 attaining certain values. The partial 





−2𝜇2(𝜆 − 1 )2(𝛼 + 𝜇) − 𝜇3  (𝜆 − 1)3 + 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)𝜆
[𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) − 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2]2
,                  (𝐴. 9) 
 






𝜆𝜇 − 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)(𝜆 + 1) − 2𝑎𝜇(𝜆 − 1)
2[𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) − 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2]2
.                (𝐴. 10) 
 
A necessary condition for (𝐴. 9) to be negative is that 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)𝜆 − 2𝜇3(𝜆 − 1 )2 −
𝜇3(𝜆 − 1 )3 < 0, which can be rewritten as 𝜇 >
𝜆
(𝜆+1)(𝜆−1)
. A necessary condition for 








PROOF: We start by demonstrating part i). Suppose instead that 𝑦∗∗ ≤ 𝑦𝑝. Using 
(𝐴. 5) and 𝑦𝑝 = 2𝑎, the assumed inequality yields  
2(𝜇+𝑎)(𝑏+𝜇(𝜆−1))+𝜇(𝑏−𝜇)(𝜆−1)
(𝑏+𝜇(𝜆−1))−𝜇2(𝜆−1)2
 ≤ 2𝑎. This 
inequality can be rewritten as  2𝜇𝑏 + 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1) + 𝜇𝑏(𝜆 − 1) + 2𝑎𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2 ≤ 0, which is 
an impossibility given that 𝜆 > 1. Then, it must be the case that 𝑦∗∗ > 𝑦𝑝.    
 
Now we demonstrate ii). We subtract (𝐴. 5) from (𝐴. 6), which yields 
 
𝑦∗∗ − 𝑔∗∗ =
(𝜇 + 𝑎)(𝜇(𝜆 − 1) + 2𝑏) + (𝑏 − 𝜇) (𝜇(𝜆 − 1) −
1
2)
𝑏 + 𝜇(𝜆 − 1) − 𝜇2(𝜆 − 1)2
.     (𝐴. 11) 
 
First, note that the denominator in (𝐴. 11) is always positive, since 𝜇 <
1
(𝜆−1)
 is a necessary 




𝑦∗∗ − 𝑔∗∗ > 0. Additionally, 𝑦∗∗ − 𝑔∗∗ >  0 if 𝜇 ≥ 𝑏 and 𝜇 <
1
2(𝜆−1)




more stringent than 𝜇 <
1
(𝜆−1)
. Thus, more stringent conditions are required to guarantee 
piling up when 𝜇 ≥ 𝑏.  
 
 








, which requires 𝜇 ≥ 𝑏 to maintain the 
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inequality, and, as is evident from the left-hand side of the inequality, it becomes less 









, which never holds since 
𝑎+𝜇
𝜇





< 1.  








. Then, if  𝜇 <
1
2(𝜆−1)
 holds, which is a more stringent condition than   𝜇 <
1
(𝜆−1)
, it is possible to find values 
of 𝑏 and 𝜇 such that negative piling up occurs. Hence, negative piling up is only possible 








PROOF: We first demonstrate i). Suppose that 𝑦∗∗|𝑏=0 < 𝑦𝑝. Using equation  




< 2𝑎, and some 
rewriting leads to 𝜇 + 2𝑎𝜇(𝜆 − 1) < 0, which is a contradiction since 𝜆 > 1. Then, it must 
be the case that 𝑦∗∗|𝑏=0 > 𝑦𝑝.     
 







1 − 𝜇(𝜆 − 1)
.                (𝐴. 12) 
 
For the feasible values that these parameters can attain, and since the tuple 
(𝑦∗∗|𝑏=0, 𝑔
∗∗|𝑏=0) is a local maximum guaranteed by 𝜇 <
1
(𝜆−1)
, it must be that  𝑦∗∗|𝑏=0 −
𝑔∗∗|𝑏=0 > 0. ∎ 
 
 
Proposition 4.  
 
PROOF: Suppose instead that 𝑦∗∗|𝑏=0 ≤ 𝑦
∗∗|𝑏>0, while 𝜇 >
𝜆
(𝜆−1)(𝜆+1)
. Using equations 






 .   
Rewriting, we get  𝜆 − 2(𝜆 − 1)(𝜇 + 𝑎) − 𝜇(𝜆 − 1)2 ≥ 0, which is a contradiction since it 
requires 𝜆 > (𝜆 − 1)𝜇(1 + 𝜆), which cannot hold for 𝜆 > 1 and 𝜇 > 0. Therefore, it must be 
that 𝑦∗∗|𝑏=0 >  𝑦










Appendix B. Simulation of the Model 
 
In this appendix, we report the results of simulations to illustrate the role of loss aversion 
in moderating the effect of monetary bonuses on performance. We plot 𝑦∗∗ against 
different levels of b and we let 𝜆 take different values. We keep 𝑎 = 0.2 fixed.  
 
We start by assuming low values of 𝜇, so that the psychological utility has a small weight 
relative to the utility of the monetary payments. Figure B.1 shows that for 𝜇 = 0.01 and 
𝜇 = 0.1, the higher the level of the bonus, b, the greater the output, for 1 < 𝜆 ≤ 2.  
 
    
Figure B.1. a) Simulation with 𝜇 = 0.01     b) Simulation with 𝜇 = 0.1 
 
In contrast, Figure B.2 shows that for relatively high values of 𝜇, namely 𝜇 = 0.2 and 𝜇 =
0.3, it is possible that output decreases as the bonus offered increases. Specifically, when 
the worker has 𝜆 ≥ 3 in Figure 2a and 𝜆 ≥ 2.5 in Figure 2b, higher bonuses yield lower 
output than lower bonuses.  
 
Finally, Figure B.3 shows that for large values of 𝜇, such as for the value of 0.5 shown in 
the figure, output is greater when the bonus offered 𝑏 is lower, even when the loss 
aversion coefficients are not too large.  
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Figure B.2. a) Simulation with 𝜇 = 0.2     b) Simulation with 𝜇 = 0.3 
 
              
  
 





























Appendix C. Details of the Risk Attitude Classifications 
 
In this appendix, we report some additional analysis of the data of part B of the 
experiment, in which utility curvature and loss-aversion are measured. These elicited data 
consist of a vector of certainty equivalents {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5} for five different lotteries, and 
the vector of offsetting loss outcomes {𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3, 𝑧4, 𝑧5} for each subject. These values can 
be analyzed to understand (1) the risk attitudes of subjects when outcomes are restricted 
to the gain domain, (2) whether risk attitudes have a sign-dependent component as 
proposed in prospect theory, and (3) how loss averse a participant is. 
 
C.1. Risk attitudes towards gains  
 
We begin by studying the elicited sequence  {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5} which informs us about the 
risk attitudes of subjects in the domain of gains. We classify each subject according to 
their risk attitude. To that end we compute the difference ∆𝑖𝑗≡ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝐸𝑉𝑗, where the index 
𝑗 indicates the lottery number, and 𝐸𝑉𝑗 stands for the expected value of that lottery. 
Formally, 𝐸𝑉𝑗 = 0.5𝐻𝑗 + 0.5𝐿𝑗 . The sign of ∆𝑖𝑗 is a non-parametric measure of the risk 
attitude of subject 𝑖 with respect to lottery 𝑗. If the subject exhibits ∆𝑖𝑗> 0, the lowest price 
at which she is willing to sell the lottery is larger than its expected value, denoting a risk-
seeking attitude. If ∆𝑖𝑗< 0, the subject has a risk averse attitude toward that lottery. Also, 
whenever ∆𝑖𝑗= 0, the subject is risk neutral.  
 
We perform a classification of subjects based on the statistical significance of their 
elicited ∆𝑖𝑗. We compute confidence intervals around zero to determine whether a ∆𝑖𝑗 is 
statistically relevant given the overall variation in the data. Specifically, we calculate the 
standard deviation of ∑ ∆𝑖𝑗𝑖  for each lottery 𝑗, and multiply it by the factors 0.64 and -0.64. 
A significantly positive ∆𝑖𝑗 indicates that subject 𝑖 is risk seeking with respect to lottery 𝑗, 
while a significantly negative ∆𝑖𝑗 indicates risk aversion. Under the assumption that the 
data follow a normal distribution, then at least 50% of the data must lie within this 
confidence interval. Furthermore, to account for response error, we classify a subject to 
have a risk averse attitude when at least four of her ∆𝑖𝑗s are negative. A subject is risk 
seeking when at least four of her  ∆𝑖𝑗s are positive, and a subject has linear utility when 
at least four ∆𝑖𝑗s are not different from zero. This is also the approach followed by 
Abdellaoui (2000) and Abdellaoui et al. (2008).    
 
Table C.1 shows that, by this criterion, the majority of subjects, 57%, are classified as 
having linear utility (proportions test against 0.5 results in p=0.048). While 40% of 
participants are classified as having concave utility (proportions test against 0.5 yields 












Lottery 1 60 24 77 
Lottery 2 80 15 66 
Lottery 3 98 16 47 
Lottery 4 77 9 75 
Lottery 5 100 11 50 
Total num. subjects 65 5 91 
 
Note: This table presents the classification of individuals according to their risk attitudes in the domain of gains. Each 
row presents the number of subjects classified as having concave, convex or linear utility, which is equivalent to saying 
that they are risk averse, risk seeking, or risk neutral, respectively. A subject 𝑖 is classified as having concave utility for 
lottery 𝑗 whenever the difference  ∆𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝐸𝑉𝑗 < 0.  A subject 𝑖 is classified as having convex utility for lottery 𝑗 
whenever the difference ∆𝑖𝑗 > 0. A subject 𝑖 is classified as having linear utility for lottery 𝑗 whenever the difference ∆𝑖𝑗 
is not significantly different from zero. The last row presents the number of subjects classified as having concave, 
convex, and linear utility over all lotteries. A subject is classified to have concave utility if she displays risk averse 
attitudes toward at least four lotteries. A subject is classified to have convex utility if she displays risk seeking attitudes 
toward at least four lotteries. Having risk neutral attitudes for at least four lotteries classify a subject as having linear 
utility.  
 
The second analysis we conduct on these data assumes that the utility function of 
subjects follows a particular functional form. We fit the certainty equivalents to these 
functionals to examine the subjects’ risk attitudes.  Specifically, we assume that the utility 
of subjects is of the power utility form, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝐸𝑉𝑗
𝛼 , which belongs to the CRRA family, or 
of the exponential utility form, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1 − exp (−𝜌𝐸𝑉𝑗) , which belongs to the CARA family. 
We estimate the parameters of these functionals, using the non-linear least squares 
method, for the pooled data of all participants. 
  
Table C.2 presents the estimates of the parameters. We find that the estimate ?̂? is 
significantly less than one, though only modestly so. This implies a utility function for a 
representative agent that has slightly risk averse attitudes (F(1,160)=127.651, p<0.001). 
Similarly, we find that the estimate ?̂? is significantly greater than zero, though still fairly 
small in magnitude. This also reveals a small degree of risk aversion on the part of the 
representative individual (F(1,160)= 3.4e+05, p<0.001). Thus, we find that subjects in 
aggregate display slight risk aversion, when functional forms with CARA and CRRA are 
estimated. This is in line with the statistical analysis of the data at the individual level, 
which found that the majority of participants were risk-neutral, but that there were also 
some subjects more appropriately classified as risk averse.  
 
C.2 Loss aversion 
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Next, we analyze the sequence of negative outcomes {𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3, 𝑧4, 𝑧5} that made the 
subjects indifferent between receiving zero for sure and a lottery consisting of 
(𝑧𝑗 , 0.5; 𝑥𝑗 , 0.5), where 𝑥𝑗 was an elicited certainty equivalent of one of the lotteries 
containing only positive outcomes. The analysis of this data reveals the degree of a 
subject’s loss aversion. The measure of loss aversion is the coefficient 𝜆𝑗 ≡ 𝑥𝑗/𝑧𝑗. When 
the 𝜆𝑖 coefficient takes the value of one, the subject is indifferent between accepting and 
declining a lottery that consists of a gain and a loss of equal magnitude, each occurring 
with probability 0.5, and thus the subject exhibits no loss aversion or gain seeking.  If the 
coefficient 𝜆𝑖 takes on a value larger than one, it indicates the presence of loss aversion. 
 
 
Table C.2 Estimates of parameters of the utility function of the representative participant 
 
Parametric form  Coefficient St. Error 𝑹𝟐 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝐸𝑉𝑗






𝜌 =. 01854 .0016 0.942 
 
 
We first analyze the loss aversion coefficients at the individual level. A subject is classified 
as loss averse when at least four (out of five) of her loss aversion coefficients satisfy 𝜆𝑖 >
1.  A subject is classified as gain-seeking when at least four (out of five) of her loss 
aversion coefficients have 𝜆𝑖 < 1. Finally, a subject is classified as having mixed attitudes 
toward losses if she cannot be classified as either loss averse or gain seeking.  Table C.3 
shows that the large majority of subjects is loss averse. Specifically, 72% of participants 
are classified as loss averse and 14% as gain-seeking.   
 
Table C.3 Individuals classified as loss averse for each xj 
 
Classification Loss Averse  Gain-Seeking Mixed  
Lottery 6 106 55 - 
Lottery 7 125   36   - 
Lottery 8 128 33   - 
Lottery 9 128 33 - 
Lottery 10 124 37 - 
Total 117 23 21 




We also perform a second analysis of these data featuring the average of the loss 
aversion coefficient that an individual exhibits over all five lotteries. The last row in Table 
C.3 shows that according to this analysis, 134 subjects, or 85% of participants, are loss 
averse and the remaining 27 subjects are gain-seeking. Thus, both analyses conclude 







Appendix D. Additional Tables and Analyses  
 
Table D.1 Descriptive statistics of goals set by round in the GOAL+BONUS and GOAL 
treatments 
 
 round 1 round 2 round 3 round 4 round 5 round 6 
GOAL+BONUS       
mean 6.076 5.948 6.179 6.205 6.461 6.615 
median 6 5 6 6 6.5 6 
S.D. 2.056 1.986 2.186 2.142 1.889 2.034 
GOAL       
mean 8.658 8.024 7.902 8 7.829 8.414 
median 7 7 7 7 7 8 






Table D.2 Effect of treatment and loss aversion on performance and goals for subjects 
with linear utility only 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







 (0.058)  (0.073)  













  (0.093)  (0.097) 
Loss Averse 0.170***  0.134*  
 (0.045)  (0.077)  
High Loss Averse  0.220***  0.114 
  (0.056)  (0.109) 
Mild Loss Averse  0.048  -0.038 
  (0.093)  (0.111) 
GOAL 0.181** 0.309** 0.218** 0.211 
 (0.082) (0.099) (0.095) (0.1306) 
HIPR 0.098*** 0.145***   
 (0.044) (0.044)   
LOPR -0.134** -0.129***   
 (0.048) (0.048)   
Constant 3.584*** 3.588*** 3.505*** 3.564*** 
 (0.464)  (0.056) (0.065) (0.097) 
Log-Likelihood -442.008 -437.376 -278.999    -282.066 
N 91 91 44 44 
 
Note: This table presents the estimates of the Poisson regression of the specification  Performance𝑖 =  β0 + β1GOAL ∗
Loss Averse + β2GOAL + β3LOPR + β4LOPR + β5Loss Averse + ℇi with ℇi~Poisson (ω), as well as the Poisson 
regression of the statistical model Goal leveli =  β0 + β1GOAL ∗ Loss Averse + β2GOAL + β3LOPR + β4LOPR +
β5Loss Averse + ℇi with ℇi~Poisson (ω) . “Performance” is the total number of tables a subject solves correctly over all 
rounds and “Goal setting” is the sum of the goals set by the subject over all rounds.  Subjects were assigned either to 
the GOAL, HIPR, LOPR, or GOAL+BONUS treatment. GOAL+BONUS is the benchmark category for the regression. 
``Loss Averse’’ is a dummy variable that captures whether a subject is loss averse or not. A subject is loss averse when 
at least four variables 𝜆𝑗 , where  𝜆𝑗 ≡ 𝑥𝑗/𝑧𝑗, are greater than one, ``Loss averse Mild’ equals 1 if a subject is loss averse 
and her average 𝜆 is lower than the median subject in the sample, and 0 otherwise. ``Loss averse High’ equals 1 if a 
subject is loss averse and her average 𝜆 is lower than the median subject in the sample and 0 otherwise. All models 
include only subjects classified as having linear utility.  Standard errors presented in parenthesis. * indicates a p-value 
<0.1, ** indicates a p-value <0.05, ***indicates a p-value <0.01. 
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Table D.3 Association of concave utility, loss aversion and treatment, with goals and 
performance  
 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
 Performance Performance Goal Level Goal Level 
GOAL*Concave 
Utility 
-0.024 -0.021 0.014 0.015 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026) 
Concave Utility -0.019* -0.012 -0.013 -0.01 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.072) 
GOAL 0.073* 0.075* 0.280*** 0.280*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.046) (0.046) 
LOPR -0.016 -0.019   
 (0.034) (0.034)   
HIPR -0.020 -0.033   
 (0.034) (0.034)   
Loss Averse  0.123***  0.139*** 
  (0.028)  (0.039) 
Constant 3.735*** 3.657*** 3.61*** 3.552*** 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.035) (0.043) 
Log-Likelihood -841.956 -832.509 -475.665 -469.368 
N 160 160 80 80 
 
Note: This table presents the estimates of the Poisson regression of the specification Performancei =  β0 + β1GOAL ∗
Concave Utility + β2GOAL + β3LOPR + β4LOPR + β5Loss Averse + ℇi with ℇi~Poisson (ω), as well as the Poisson 
regression of the statistical model Goal leveli =  β0 + β1GOAL ∗ Concave Utility + β2GOAL + β3LOPR + β4LOPR +
β5Loss Averse + ℇi with ℇi~Poisson (ω) . “Performance” is the number of tables a subject correctly solves over all rounds 
and “Goal setting” the sum of the goals set by the subject over all rounds.  Subjects were assigned either to the 
GOAL,“HIPR, LOPR, or GOAL+BONUS treatment. The last is the benchmark category for the regression. ``Loss 
Averse’’ is a dummy variable that indicates whether a subject is loss averse or not. A subject is loss averse when at 
least four of her 𝜆𝑗 , where  𝜆𝑗 ≡ 𝑥𝑗/𝑧𝑗, are greater than one.  ``Concave Utility” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a 
subject exhibits concave utility and zero otherwise. A subject exhibits concave utility when at least four of her variables 
∆j, where  ∆j ≡ 𝑥𝑗 − 𝐸𝑉𝐽, are less than zero. Standard errors are in parenthesis. * indicates a p-value <0.1, ** indicates 





















Appendix E. Experimental Instructions  
 
E.1  Welcome  
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The instructions are simple 
and if you follow them and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount 
of money, which will be paid to you at the end of the experiment. The amount of payment 
you receive depends on your decisions, your effort, and partly on luck. The currency used 
throughout the experiment is Dollars. 
Once the experiment has started, no one is allowed to talk to anybody other than the 
experimenter. Anyone who violates this rule will lose his or her right to participate in this 
experiment. If you have further questions when reading these instructions please do not 
hesitate to raise your hand and formulate the question to the experimenter. 
The experiment consists of two parts. A counting task part and a decision-making part. 
Both tasks will count towards your final earnings. 
E.2  Part A: Counting task 
This part of the experiment consists of a sequence of 6 rounds of 5 minutes each. In 
each round you need to complete as many tasks as possible. A task is completed when 
you count the correct number of zeros in a table that contains 100 zeros and ones. 
As soon as you know the correct number of zeros contained in a table, you have to input 
your answer using the keyboard. Once you have entered the number, click "Next". 
Immediately afterwards a new table will be displayed and, again, you have to count the 
number of zeros in this new table. This procedure is repeated until the time is up. A timer 
is displayed in the upper part of your screen. After each round is over you receive 
feedback about your performance in that round. 
Counting Tips: Of course you can count the zeros in any way you want. Speaking from 
experience, however, it is helpful to always count two zeros at once and multiply the 
resulting number by two at the end. In addition, you miscount less frequently if you track 
the number you are currently counting with the mouse cursor. 
you will see an example when you press "Next". 
(example is displayed) 
Payments  
(LOPR treatment) 
For each correct task that you complete you receive 0.20 Dollars, but if your answer was 
wrong you receive nothing. 
 
The formula we use to calculate your earnings is Earnings = # correct tasks * 0.20 Dollars. 
(HIPR treatment) 
For each correct task that you complete you receive 0.50 Dollars, but if your answer was 
wrong you receive nothing. 
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The formula we use to calculate your earnings is Earnings = # correct tasks * 0.50 Dollars. 
 (GOAL treatment) 
For each correct task that you complete you receive 0.20 Dollars, but if your answer was 
wrong you receive nothing. 
 
Goal: At the beginning of each round you will be asked to set a goal in terms of the number 
of tables you aim at solving correctly in that specific round. Provide this target at this best 
ability, we would like to see how accurate is your prediction 
The formula we use to calculate your earnings is Earnings = # correct tasks * 0.20 Dollars  
 (GOAL+BONUS treatment) 
For each correct task that you complete you receive 0.20 Dollars, but if your answer was 
wrong you receive nothing. 
Goal: At the beginning of each round you will be asked to set a goal in terms of the 
number of tables you aim at solving correctly in that specific round. If you achieve your 
goal or you surpass it, you will be paid an additional bonus. The bonus is larger the 
large the goal is set. If your goal is high and you achieve it or surpass you will be given 
a high monetary reward. But, if your goal is low and you accomplish it or surpass it you 
will be given a low monetary reward. Also be aware that if you set a very high goal and 
you cannot accomplish it you will get no bonus. 
The formula we use to calculate your earnings is Earnings = # correct tasks * 0.20 
Dollars + goal * 20 cents.  
Are you ready to start now? As soon as you press "Next" the task will start. 
 
E.3 Part B: decision-making part 
 
 the following, you will face a series of decisions. Your task in each decision is to choose 
among two possible alternatives. Your earnings on this part of the experiment depend on 
your choices. 
You will be faced with 10 decision sets. Each decision set contains several choices. In 
each of decision you need to choose between the option R, that delivers a sure amount 
of money, and the option L that results in one of two different monetary amounts. 
Note that in each decision set you need to choose between L and R multiple times. 
But, you need to be careful since the offered amounts of money could change from one 
decision to the next. 
you will see an example when you press "Next" 
Payments 
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At the end of this part of the experiment one randomly chosen decision will be played and 
paid. Hence, a random number chosen by the program will be drawn to determine which 
decision counts towards your earnings. 
This means that each choice that you make might be chosen and paid. 
If it is clear what you have to do in this part of the experiment, press "Next" to start. 
 
E.4 Exit Questionnaire.  
 
This is the last part of the experiment. Please answer the following questions at your best 
ability. 
Enter the computer (Letter plus digit) you are at. 
Enter your age. 
What is the program you are studying? 
Enter your gender. 
Male Female 
What is your nationality? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
